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Abstract
We examined how social cues (the conversational partner’s viewpoint) and representational
ones (the intrinsic structure of a spatial layout) jointly shape people’s spatial memory representa-
tions and their subsequent descriptions. In 24 pairs, Directors studied an array with a symmetrical
structure while either knowing their Matcher’s subsequent viewpoint or not. During the subsequent
description of the array, the array’s intrinsic structure was aligned with the Director, the Matcher,
or neither partner. According to memory tests preceding descriptions, Directors who had studied
the array while aligned with its structure were more likely to use its orientation as an organizing
direction. Directors who had studied the array while misaligned with its structure used its orienta-
tion more frequently as an organizing orientation when knowing that the Matcher would be
aligned with it, but used their own viewpoint more frequently as an organizing direction when not
knowing the Matcher’s viewpoint. Directors also adapted their descriptions strategically, using
more egocentric expressions when aligned with the intrinsic structure and more partner-centered
expressions when their Matchers were the ones aligned with the structure, even when this informa-
tion wasn’t available in advance. These findings suggest that speakers are guided by converging
social and representational cues to adapt flexibly the organization of their memories and the
perspectives of their descriptions.
Keywords: Perspective-taking; Spatial memory; Intrinsic structure; Audience design; Common
ground; Spatial descriptions
1. Introduction
People routinely have to access spatial information from memory and convey it to their
conversational partners in order to coordinate in a range of activities, from arranging a
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meeting point on campus to describing the layout of a recently visited museum. When
people coordinate in such real-world circumstances, they often occupy different vantage
points, as for example when they move a piece of furniture together or when one pro-
vides directions to the other over the phone. Moreover, the real-world environments that
people describe or within which they coordinate are often systematically organized, hav-
ing axes of symmetry or salient landmarks. When selecting the perspective from which to
describe a spatial arrangement, people therefore consider not only their partner’s vantage
point but also other representational cues, intrinsic to the arrangement. In the present
work, we investigate precisely how people weigh these social and representational cues
when spontaneously organizing spatial information in memory and when subsequently
describing it.
When people make spatial judgments, they access memory representations that main-
tain spatial relations around a preferred organizing direction (e.g., McNamara, 2003;
Mou, McNamara, Valiquette, & Rump, 2004). The selection of a preferred direction
involves interpreting a spatial configuration in terms of a reference system (a process
analogous to determining its “top”). A consequence of this organization is that spatial
relations specified with respect to the preferred direction can be retrieved from memory
more readily than those relations that are not explicitly specified and thus have to be
inferred. The preferred direction of spatial memories is often determined by egocentric
preferences for organizing information based on one’s initially experienced viewpoint
(Richard & Waller, 2013; Shelton & McNamara, 2001). But it can also be influenced by
representational cues, such as the environment’s geometry (Shelton & McNamara, 2001),
the intrinsic features of the spatial configuration arising from its symmetry (Li, Carlson,
Mou, Williams, & Miller, 2011; Mou & McNamara, 2002) and orthogonality (Richard &
Waller, 2013), functional features of landmarks in the configuration (Taylor & Tversky,
1992), and even explicit instructions (Greenauer & Waller, 2008). When organizing spa-
tial information in memory, people also seem to take social cues into consideration, such
as their conversational partner’s viewpoint (Galati, Michael, Mello, Greenauer, & Avraa-
mides, 2013; Shelton & McNamara, 2004). However, the extent to which they do so is
still unclear.
One study by Shelton and McNamara (2004) examined whether describing spatial
information from the partner’s viewpoint influences speakers’ resulting memory represen-
tations. After describing a randomly configured layout to their partner who could not
freely interact with them, speakers indeed used their partner’s viewpoint as an organizing
direction. They were more accurate to make spatial judgments from perspectives aligned
with the one that had been occupied by their partner than from other perspectives (includ-
ing their own). However, because in this study, speakers were explicitly instructed to use
their partner’s viewpoint for the descriptions (during which they built their memory repre-
sentations), it is not surprising that they used their partner’s viewpoint as an organizing
direction.
The question therefore remained as to whether in fact speakers spontaneously organize
their memory representations around their partner’s viewpoint. We recently adapted Shel-
ton and McNamara’s (2004) study to examine this. In Galati et al. (2013), one participant
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first studied a randomly configured layout, while either knowing or not knowing their
partner’s subsequent viewpoint, which was misaligned by 90°, 135°, or 180°. In memory
tests preceding descriptions, we found no facilitation for the partner’s viewpoint when it
was available (cf. Shelton & McNamara, 2004). Nevertheless, despite not using their part-
ners’ viewpoint as an organizing direction, speakers did represent that viewpoint in mem-
ory: They took longer to imagine orienting to perspectives known to be aligned with their
partner (at least when partners where misaligned by 90° and 135°) and rotated their array
drawings by a few degrees toward the partner’s viewpoint. These findings suggest that
when speakers are not “forced” to adopt a particular viewpoint and can interact freely
with their partners, they may not have sufficient pragmatic motivation to invest the cogni-
tive effort at study to organize spatial relations around a nonegocentric viewpoint.
Instead, they represent the partner’s viewpoint and use it later as needed.
In the present study, we ask whether reinforcing the partner’s viewpoint with addi-
tional cues, such as the orientation of the intrinsic structure of the layout, could afford
sufficient pragmatic motivation to organize spatial relations around the partner’s view-
point. Our view is that, when selecting a direction for organizing spatial relations in
memory, people consider a confluence of different sources of information, including
egocentric cues (e.g., their own learning viewpoint), representational cues (e.g., the ori-
entation of the layout’s intrinsic structure), and social cues (e.g., the partner’s view-
point), combining them probabilistically according to their salience and relevance to
the task. This is broadly compatible with the proposal that the selection of the orga-
nizing direction from which to learn and remember a spatial layout depends on a
number of cues, including spatial and nonspatial properties of the objects, the structure
of the surrounding environment, the observer’s egocentric viewpoint, and verbal
instructions (Mou & McNamara, 2002; Shelton & McNamara, 2001). We agree, but
we do not ascribe precedence to egocentric experience (Richard & Waller, 2013; Shel-
ton & McNamara, 2001) or to the intrinsic structure of the layout (Mou & McNamar-
a, 2002) as the dominant cue; instead, our approach emphasizes the probabilistic
combination of all available cues. Thus, we expect that in a collaborative task the
relation of the orientation of the configuration’s intrinsic structure to one’s own view-
point and to their conversational partner’s viewpoint should determine the direction
selected to organize spatial relations in memory: when either person’s viewpoint is
reinforced by the intrinsic structure’s orientation, it should be more likely to be used
as an organizing direction.
This prediction is also consistent with the proposal that, in collaborative tasks, people
share responsibility for mutual understanding and try to minimize their collective effort,
with one partner investing greater cognitive effort to ensure mutual understanding upon
appraising that the other is likely to find the interaction difficult (Clark, 1996; Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). To determine who might find the task most difficult, people con-
sider different sources of information, including what has been shared through spoken
utterances (their linguistic co-presence) and what is visually available in their shared
environment (their physical co-presence) (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark & Marshall,
1981).
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A growing body of evidence suggests that such social cues modulate people’s attribu-
tions about the partner’s ability to contribute to the task at hand, and thus influence
whether they adopt their partner’s spatial perspective. Specifically, people are more
likely to invest the cognitive effort to adopt their partner’s perspective when they per-
ceive the partner to be limited in some way. For instance, when listeners believe that
their partners do not know their viewpoint they are more likely to interpret spatial
descriptions from the partner’s perspective, whereas when they believe that their partner
is real (vs. simulated) they are more likely to interpret descriptions egocentrically, pre-
sumably because they shift the burden of ensuring mutual understanding to the partner
(Duran, Dale, & Kreuz, 2011). Similarly, in production tasks, when speakers describe
simple or randomly configured layouts, they are more likely to use their partner’s per-
spective when the partner does not share their viewpoint (Mainwaring, Tversky, Ohgishi,
& Schiano, 2003; Schober, 1993, 1995), is imaginary (Schober, 1993), cannot provide
feedback (Shelton & McNamara, 2004), or has worse spatial abilities than they do
(Schober, 2009). And when describing routes in a familiar urban environment to an
imaginary partner unfamiliar with the environment (vs. for themselves), speakers elabo-
rate their descriptions by using more words and details and referring to more landmarks
for orienting, while also simplifying the routes by navigating along fewer, larger and
more prominent streets (H€olscher, Tenbrink, & Wiener, 2011). This last study under-
scores that social cues (e.g., the partner’s familiarity with the environment) guide the
extent to which representational cues (e.g., landmarks and other salient features of the
environment) are utilized in descriptions, in line with our proposal that multiple sources
of information interact during spatial reasoning.
However, our earlier work has examined whether a single social cue (the availability
of the partner’s viewpoint) influences perspective selection (Galati et al., 2013). The pres-
ent work examines how social and representational cues may jointly influence the pre-
ferred direction of people’s memory representations and the perspective of their
descriptions. In addressing this question, we also aim to clarify the extent to which peo-
ple rely on the organization of their memory representations to describe spatial informa-
tion when representational and social cues become available at different time points. For
instance, when speakers discover their partner’s viewpoint relative to a symmetrical con-
figuration only after they have already encoded the configuration in memory, do they
select the perspective of their descriptions according to the organization of their memo-
ries or according to the new, perceptually available information? Most earlier studies do
not speak to this issue as they focus on speakers’ perspective choices when they describe
spatial information that is visually accessible (e.g., Schober, 1993, 1995; 2009; Mainwar-
ing et al., 2003), where the learning of spatial information co-occurs with the description
(Shelton & McNamara, 2004), or where their underlying memory representations of
familiar environments are not directly assessed (H€olscher et al., 2011).
In our earlier work, in which we dissociated the learning of spatial layouts from their
description and examined speakers’ memory representations directly, we found that
speakers don’t merely rely on their initial representations but are able to use perceptually
available information (i.e., their degree of misalignment from their partners) to adapt
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descriptions appropriately (Galati et al., 2013). When perspective-taking was relatively
easy for speakers during the description (when misaligned by the small offset of 90° from
their partners) speakers used partner-centered expressions more often, whereas when per-
spective-taking was relatively difficult (when misaligned by the oblique offset of 135°)
they used egocentric expressions more often. Advance knowledge of the partner’s view-
point did not determine on its own the perspective of speakers’ descriptions, although it
did enable partners to recognize in advance when perspective-taking would be most diffi-
cult for each of them and to adapt their strategies in ways that facilitated coordination.
Here, we examine whether speakers will adapt just as flexibly when the configuration
has an intrinsic structure. After studying such a configuration, speakers have to describe
it to a partner who tries to reconstruct it from a different spatial viewpoint, such that its
intrinsic structure is aligned with the speaker, their partner, or neither partner. We expect
that speakers will adapt their descriptions by combining all cues, whether available in
advance or at the interaction, with the aim of minimizing the collective effort of them-
selves and their partner (e.g., Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). This prediction
—that the “optimal” perspective will be the one reinforced by multiple cues—contrasts
with the proposal that speakers initially behave egocentrically and consider their partner’s
perspective only later, in order to repair misunderstandings (Horton & Keysar, 1996;
Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Paek, 1998; Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998). Such a “two-stage”
model of adaptation in perspective-taking would predict that speakers should opt for their
own viewpoint as the organizing direction of their memories and, at least initially,
describe that information to their partner from their own perspective.
Instead, we predict that if the convergence of available cues at the description strongly
biases a particular perspective (e.g., when the partner’s viewpoint and the structure’s
intrinsic orientation coincide), speakers can override their initial memory representation
(even an egocentric one) when selecting the perspective of their descriptions. Advance
knowledge of the partner’s viewpoint and its relation to the intrinsic structure may still
influence descriptions if it highlights alternative perspectives for encoding and describing
the layout that would facilitate coordination during the description. For instance, knowing
the partner’s viewpoint while studying the layout from an oblique viewpoint may make
the structure’s axis of symmetry more apparent and influence both how speakers organize
spatial information in memory and how they describe it. To our knowledge, this study is
the first to systematically examine how multiple cues interact as they become available
during the course of spatial-perspective taking.
2. Method
2.1. Design
Directors first studied a layout that had an intrinsic structure, then their memory of the
layout was assessed, and finally they described the layout to a partner—their Matcher—
who reconstructed the layout on the basis of the Directors’ descriptions. Between pairs,
A. Galati, M. N. Avraamides / Cognitive Science 39 (2015) 743
we manipulated the alignment of the layout’s intrinsic structure with either partner during
the description: Some Directors studied layouts while aligned with the orientation of the
intrinsic structure (referred to as 0°, see Fig. 1) and later described it to a Matcher who
was offset by 135°, measured counterclockwise from 0° (Aligned with Director condi-
tion). Others studied layouts from 225° and later described it to a Matcher who was at 0°
(Aligned with Matcher condition). And yet others studied layouts again from 225° and
later described to a Matcher who was offset by 135°; as such, both partners were mis-
aligned with the orientation of the intrinsic structure (Aligned with Neither condition).
We also manipulated the partners’ advance knowledge of their respective viewpoints dur-
ing the description: Half of the Directors in each alignment condition studied the layout
while knowing where their Matcher would later be, whereas the remaining did not.1 Thus,
the partners’ alignment with the intrinsic structure’s orientation and the Directors’
advance knowledge of their partner’s viewpoint were both between-subjects factors.
2.2. Participants
Forty-eight undergraduate and graduate students (24 pairs) from the University of
Cyprus participated for payment or as unpaid volunteers. Half of the participants partici-
pated as Directors and the remaining half as Matchers. Of the 24 Director–Matcher pairs,
6 were female-female pairs, 6 were male-male pairs, 6 were mixed-gender pairs with
female Directors, and 6 were mixed-gendered pairs with male Directors.2 All pairs of par-
ticipants were recruited to be friends.
Fig. 1. The seven-object array used (including a flashlight, yoyo, bucket, battery, candle, marble, and vase),
indicating 0°, 135°, and 225° headings.
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2.3. Procedure
Upon the pair’s arrival to the lab, it was explained that one of them, serving as the
coordinator (Director), would study an array of real objects, have their memory of it
tested, and then describe it to the other participant, serving as the collaborator
(Matcher), who would reconstruct it at their own table based on the Director’s
description. Participants then gave informed consent for participation; they could also
sign an optional release form for use of their video and audio data for scientific pur-
poses.
2.3.1. Practice phase
Directors then completed a practice phase to familiarize them with the Judgments of
Relative Direction (JRD) task, while Matchers waited in the testing room. While seated
at 180° (relative to the intrinsic structure of the test array), they studied an array of four
objects (a right-angle trapezoid) without a time limit to memorize it. They then practiced
performing JRDs, first through pointing with the hand and with visual access to the array,
and then through pointing with a joystick for trials presented on a computer and without
visual access to the array. On each JRD trial, Directors were instructed to imagine being
at one location (station object) facing a second (orienting object), constituting an imag-
ined heading or viewpoint, and to point to a third object, the target (e.g., Imagine being
at x, facing y. Point to z.).
2.3.2. Study phase
After the practice phase, Directors studied the test array, while either aligned or mis-
aligned with its structure (from either 0° or 225°) and while either knowing where their
Matcher would be during the description phase or not.
The test array was a configuration that had an axis of symmetry and comprised seven
common objects, which lacked intrinsic front-back and left-right axes. As Fig. 1 shows,
the configuration was symmetrical around a central axis (formed by the marble, bucket,
and flashlight). It was displayed on a 70 cm-diameter circular table, and all the distances
between adjacent objects along the structure’s axes were 17.5 cm.
When the Matcher’s viewpoint was known at study, the Matcher sat at a separate,
identical table next to the Director’s (see Fig. 2) at the position they would occupy during
the description (at 0° or at 135°); both partners were explicitly told that this would be the
Matcher’s subsequent position. When the Matcher’s viewpoint was not known at study,
the Matcher waited in the adjacent testing room. Once the Directors indicated they had
learned the array, they were verbally administered six JRD trials while wearing a blind-
fold that prevented visual access to the objects. At this stage, Directors could remove the
blindfold to study the array further if needed.
2.3.3. Testing phase
Directors then moved to an adjacent room to complete the two memory tasks. Testing
was not in the study room in order to ensure that Directors used an enduring off-line spa-
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tial representation as opposed to a transient sensorimotor representation of the array (see
Avraamides & Kelly, 2008, for a discussion).
2.3.3.1. Judgment of relative direction (JRDs): On a given JRD trial, Directors first read
a statement in the form “Imagine being at x, facing y,” (e.g., “Imagine being at the
bucket, facing the marble”), pressed a button on a joystick once they adopted that head-
ing, and then responded to a second statement in the form “Point to z” (e.g., “Point to
candle”) by deflecting the joystick in the direction of z as if they were facing y and
pressing a button to log in their response. Sixty-four such trials were presented individu-
ally on a computer screen at a comfortable distance from the participants. They included
eight imagined headings (0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°, 225°, 270°, 315° relative to the orien-
tation of the intrinsic structure) and their order was randomized. In selecting the trials,
we aimed to represent equally each combination of station and orienting objects corre-
sponding to each heading, balancing the number of trials with right and left responses,
and representing objects comparably as station points, orienting objects and targets.
Fig. 2. Setup of a study phase in which the Director was aligned with the array’s intrinsic structure (at 0°),
while the Matcher was misaligned with it (at 135°).
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Our measures of interest were the Directors’ orientation and response latencies.3 Orien-
tation latency was defined as the time from the offset of the instruction to adopt an imag-
ined perspective to the press of the joystick button to indicate that the imagined
perspective was adopted. Response latency was defined as the time from the offset of the
instruction to point to the target object to the press of the button to log the response after
deflecting the joystick.
2.3.3.2. Array drawings: After the JRDs, Directors were given a 20 cm-diameter grid
(with 1 mm lines) representing the display table and were asked to reconstruct as accu-
rately as possible the studied array by placing on the grid seven circular transparent
markers, each labeled with a name of the array’s objects and a dot in the center repre-
senting the object’s center. For each Director, after completion, the position of the dot for
each marker was noted on the grid along with the object’s name, and the participant’s
viewing perspective during the drawing task with an arrow at the bottom (see Fig. 3).
We were primarily interested in whether the arrays were drawn from an orthogonal or
oblique perspective relative to the structure (i.e., drawn aligned or misaligned with the
structure).
Fig. 3. Example of a Director’s array drawing annotated with the coordinates of each object’s location as
placed by the Director on the circle, along with the Director’s reconstruction viewpoint (indicated by the
arrow at the bottom). This drawing was visually classified by coders as being drawn from a misaligned per-
spective (roughly 225°, which was indeed the Director’s study viewpoint). The rotational parameter h con-
firmed that this array was in fact drawn from 249°.
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2.3.4. Description phase
After the testing phase, Directors returned to the original room for the description.
Directors described the array’s configuration from memory, while the Matcher used the
seven objects to reconstruct the array at their own table. Instructions to both participants
emphasized that they could interact freely and that they should reconstruct the array so
that, given the Director’s viewpoint at study, objects be translated to the Matcher’s table
(i.e., not rotated by the Matcher’s offset). Directors were not restricted in how they could
describe the objects to the Matchers: They were told that they were free to describe the
objects from their own perspective, their Matcher’s perspective, a third perspective, focus
on the relationships between objects, a combination of these options, or in any other way
they wished. Similarly, Matchers were not restricted in terms of the feedback they could
provide. Their only restriction was that Directors could not look over the barrier (113 cm
tall) that separated them to monitor how Matchers reconstructed the objects on their table.
After turning on the cameras, the experimenter left the room for the description phase.
After completing the description phase, pairs were given a brief questionnaire about
how well acquainted they were with each other, were debriefed, and compensated with
10 Euros for their time, if paid. Experimental sessions took about 1 h.
2.4. Coding the Directors’ descriptions
2.4.1. Spatial expressions
Upon transcribing each pair’s interaction during the description phase in detail, includ-
ing contributions by both Directors and Matchers, we identified spatial expressions in the
Directors’ turns. We considered spatial expressions to include (a) locative adverbs, for
example, “to your left” (aristera su), “in between” (anamesa), “next to” (dhipla); (b) geo-
metric shapes and metrics, for example, “straight line” (efthia grammi), “triangle” (trig-
ono), “ninety degrees” (eneninta mires); (c) directional verbs accompanied by a spatial
adverb, for example, “go up” (pienne pano); (d) verbs describing spatial relationships or
the movement of objects, for example, “it sticks out a bit” (eksehi llio), “increase the
angles” (megalos’tes gonies); (e) spatial adjectives, for example, “distant” (apomakris-
meno); and (f) abstracted shapes used as analogies for the intrinsic structure “it looks like
a house” (miazi me spiti).
We adapted our coding scheme from Galati et al. (2013) to classify spatial expressions
in the Directors’ turns as being from:
1. the Director’s perspective (Director-centered), for example, “in front of me is the
marble” (mprosta mu en i mpilia)
2. the Matcher’s perspective (Matcher-centered), for example, “the vase is to your left”
(to vaso en sta aristera su)
3. a nonperson centered heading aligned with the axis of the intrinsic structure (Struc-
ture-centered). In the following example, a Director at 225° uses three spatial adjec-
tives (perpendicular, left, and right) from a Structure-centered perspective with a
Matcher at 135°: “On the perpendicular. You’re supposed to be on one side on the
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left, and I’m on the one side of the table on the right.” (sto katheto. esi ipotithete
ise sti mia plevra aristera, ji ego sti mia plevra tou trapeziou dexia)
4. a perspective other than the Director’s, the Matcher’s, or the structure’s (Other head-
ing), for example, “say the candle is facing the bucket, from the bucket it’s on the
left” (pes oti to keri thori ton kouva, opos en o kouvas, aristera).
5. a Νeutral perspective capturing inter-object relations independent of a particular
viewpoint, for example, “it’s close to the bucket” (en konta ston kouva) or “they
form a triangle” (schematizun trigono)
6. an Ambiguous perspective for expressions that could be interpreted as involving
more than one of the above perspectives
Expressions from three more categories (Both-centered, Environment-centered, and
Intrinsic; see Galati et al., 2013 for more information) collectively comprised less than
2% of all spatial expressions and will not be considered further.
Person-centered expressions were often implicit (65% of Director-centered expressions
and 49% of Matcher-centered ones) and did not involve the use of personal pronouns
(e.g., “it’s on the left,” en aristera). When classifying these implicit perspectives or other
initially ambiguous cases, coders considered multiple sources of information, including
the configuration of objects that Directors were describing, the respective viewpoints of
the Director and Matcher, the prior discourse (e.g., if partners had explicitly agreed on a
perspective), and the Director’s array drawing (to establish the perspective from which
Directors had organized objects in memory).
2.4.2. Reliability
The first author coded 20 pairs, while a second coder redundantly coded six pairs as
well as the remaining four pairs. Prior to comparing their judgments, the coders discussed
52 instances for which there was disagreement over the segmentation of spatial expres-
sions (i.e., cases where one coder identified a spatial expression while the other did not,
or one coder parsed a phrase as two spatial expressions while the other did as one). All
disagreements on segmentation were resolved by discussing them until consensus was
reached. The remaining, nonredundantly coded dialogs were checked for consistent appli-
cation of the agreed-upon criteria. For the 383 spatial expressions from the redundantly
coded dialogs, the two coders made identical classifications 98% of the time,
Kappa = .98, p < .001, exhibiting almost perfect agreement (see Landis & Koch, 1977).
3. Results
3.1. Spatial memory
Since Directors could be divided into those who drew arrays from perspectives aligned
with the structure’s axes (i.e., from an orthogonal viewpoint) and those who did so from
a perspective oblique to the structure (specifically, from their study viewpoint of 225°),
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we first consider whether the distribution of the array drawings depended on the condi-
tions at learning. We then turn to their JRD performance to corroborate that Directors
indeed organized object relations in memory as indicated by their drawings’ orientation.
3.1.1. Array drawings
We classified each drawing as being drawn from one of the orthogonal or oblique per-
spectives relative to the structure. Of the 24 drawings, 15 drawings were classified as
being aligned and 9 as being misaligned with the structure’s axes. Our Directors’ aligned
drawings were from three of the four orthogonal viewpoints: eight drawings from 0°, six
from 180°, and one from 270°. All misaligned drawings were from 225° (see example in
Fig. 3). Our categorization was checked against the rotation parameter (h), indicating the
degree the drawn configuration was rotated relative to the intrinsic structure of array.4 To
derive h (and also the bidimensional regression coefficient, BDr, described below), we
used Friedman and Kohler’s (2003) bidimensional regression tool and recommendations
to compare the Directors’ drawings to the studied array, applying a Euclidean transforma-
tion to the veridical array coordinates.
We then examined the distribution of array drawings that were aligned with the struc-
ture (i.e., from one of the orthogonal viewpoints) versus misaligned with the structure
(namely, from 225°) according to what Directors had known about their Matcher’s view-
point. Directors who studied the array while aligned with the intrinsic structure (from 0°)
all used an axis of the structure as the organizing direction of their drawings (specifically,
0°), whether they knew the Matcher’s viewpoint (135°) or not. On the other hand, as
Table 1 shows, for Directors who studied the array while misaligned with its structure
(from 225°), advance knowledge of their Matcher’s viewpoint influenced the orientation
of their drawings. When the Matcher’s viewpoint was unavailable, they were more likely
to use their study viewpoint (225°) to draw the array. But when they had known in
advance that the Matcher was aligned with the array’s intrinsic structure, they used the
structure’s axes as an organizing direction more frequently. When Directors had known
Table 1
Proportion and number of Directors who studied arrays from 225° and drew arrays as aligned with the intrin-
sic structure (from one of its orthogonal viewpoints) vs. from their own viewpoint, according to what they
knew about their Matcher’s viewpoint at study
Drawing Aligned With Intrinsic Structure Drawing Aligned With Study Viewpoint (from 225°)
Does not know Matcher’s viewpoint
Proportion .25 .75
N 2 6
Knows Matcher is at 0°
Proportion .75 .25
N 3 1
Knows Matcher is at 135°
Proportion .50 .50
N 2 2
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in advance that the Matcher would also be misaligned with the intrinsic structure (at
135°), half of the Directors opted for their study viewpoint and half used an axis of the
structure as their organizing direction. The probability that the overall distribution of the
drawings’ orientation was observed by chance is small (p = .03, Fisher’s exact test).
Finally, we examined the bidimensional regression coefficient (BDr) for each Direc-
tor’s drawings to ask whether the distortion in the relative positioning of objects, as
reflected by BDr, would depend on the orientation of Directors’ drawings. BDr estimates
the goodness-of-fit between the drawings and the actual coordinates of the arrays, captur-
ing unsystematic error in reconstructions when systematic biases are accounted for. Direc-
tors who had drawn arrays aligned with the structure drew arrays that were numerically
less distorted than those who had drawn arrays misaligned with the structure, from their
study viewpoint of 225° (arrays drawn aligned with structure: BDr = .99, SD = .02;
arrays drawn misaligned with structure: BDr = .90, SD = .21). This difference was mar-
ginally significant according to an independent samples t-test on the Fisher-transformed
BDr: t (22) = 1.91, p = .07. Advance knowledge of the Matcher’s viewpoint did not
reliably influence the distortion of the Directors’ array drawings.
To summarize, the viewpoint from which Directors drew their arrays depended both
on their own viewpoint at study and what they had known about their partner: Directors
studying arrays from 0° strongly preferred that viewpoint, whereas those studying arrays
from 225° varied in their preferences depending on what they had known about their
Matcher’s viewpoint. These Directors preferred more frequently their own viewpoint
when they did not know where their Matcher would be, whereas they preferred more fre-
quently an orthogonal viewpoint when Matchers were at 0°. This preference was reflected
by the orientation of their drawings, which was confirmed by the rotational parameter h.
Arrays drawn from one of the orthogonal viewpoints of the structure (specifically, 0°,
180°, and 270°) were also somewhat less distorted than those drawn from the oblique
viewpoint of 225°.
3.1.2. Directors’ judgments of relative direction
To confirm that Directors had organized spatial locations in memory according to how
they had oriented their array drawings, we analyzed their orientation and response laten-
cies from the JRD task with their drawings’ orientation (aligned vs. misaligned with the
structure) as a between subjects factor, while ignoring the availability of their Matcher’s
particular viewpoint at study.5 That is, we examined whether Directors who drew arrays
aligned with the structure (in our corpus from 0°, 180°, 270°) and those who drew arrays
misaligned with the structure (in our corpus from 225°) showed facilitation for that pre-
ferred direction.
As Fig. 4a and b illustrate, the Directors’ orientation and response latencies were con-
sistent with the preferred orientation of their array drawings. Directors who had drawn
arrays aligned with the structure were generally faster to orient to and respond from head-
ings aligned with the structure’s orthogonal axes (0°, 90°, 180°, 270°) than from the obli-
que headings (45°, 135°, 225°, 315°). The reverse was the case for Directors who had
drawn arrays from 225°. This led to a significant interaction between the heading from
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which the array was drawn and the JRD trial’s imagined heading for both orientation
latencies, F(7, 154) = 4.96, p < .001, and response latencies, F(7, 154) = 7.60, p < .001.
Directors’ latencies differed significantly across imagined headings, both for those who
drew the array aligned with the structure (orientation latencies: F(7, 98) = 3.55, p < .01;
response latencies: F(7, 98) = 4.58, p < .001), and for those who drew the array from
their study viewpoint of 225° (orientation latencies: F(7, 56) = 3.19, p < .01; response
latencies: F (7, 56) = 4.76, p < .001).
We examined this sawtooth pattern of performance by fitting planned contrasts with
weights: 1.625, .875, 0.625, 1.375, 1.625, 1.375, 0.625, .875.6 For Directors who
drew arrays aligned with the structure, this planned contrast with the minima at 0° and
180° described adequately their orientation latencies, F(1, 14) = 10.34, p < .01, account-
ing for 88% of the variance associated with the imagined heading and leaving a nonsig-
nificant amount of variance unaccounted for (p = .98). The planned contrast also
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. Orientation latencies (a) and response latencies (b) in secs across imagined headings according to
how Directors had drawn arrays.
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described adequately the response latencies of these Directors, F(1, 14) = 21.14, p < .01,
accounting for 86% of the variance associated with the imagined heading and leaving a
nonsignificant amount of variance unaccounted for (p = .98).
For Directors who drew arrays from their 225° study viewpoint, the sawtooth contrast
with the minima at 225° and its counteraligned heading (45°) described adequately their
orientation latencies, F(1, 8) = 6.43, p < .05, accounting for 62% of the variance associ-
ated with the imagined heading and leaving a non-significant amount of variance unac-
counted for (p = .82). The planned contrast was marginally significant when applied to
these Directors’ response latencies, F(1, 8) = 4.22, p = .07.
Collectively, the orientation latencies and response latencies provide converging evi-
dence that Directors organized the arrays in memory in a way consistent with how they
had drawn them. Directors were generally faster to orient to and respond from headings
aligned with their preferred direction and its perpendicular headings. This could mean
that Directors represented the configuration from all the facilitated headings (McNamara,
2003) or that at retrieval they more easily adopted headings orthogonal to their preferred
direction relative to oblique ones.
3.2. Spatial descriptions
Overall, Directors produced most frequently Neutral expressions in their descriptions
(48% of all 1,609 spatial expressions), with Matcher-centered expressions constituting
20%, Director-centered 15%, Structure-centered 8%, ambiguous expressions 5%, and
other headings 2% and of all expressions. Given our interest in how Directors adapted
their descriptions according to the alignment of the intrinsic structure with either partner
(and their advance knowledge of that), we focus our analyses on the distribution of those
expressions of theoretical interest: Director-centered, Matcher-centered, and Structure-cen-
tered expressions. The distribution of these three types of expressions differed reliably,
F(2, 36) = 7.37, p < .01, with Directors producing significantly fewer Structure-centered
expressions than Director-centered, F(1, 18) = 5.26, p < .05, and Matcher-centered
expressions, F(1, 18) = 13.72, p < .01.
The partners’ alignment with the intrinsic structure influenced the distribution of these
three types of expressions, F(4, 36) = 3.96, p < .01. This interaction was driven by
Directors using more Matcher-centered expressions than Director-centered ones (38% vs.
2%) when the Matcher was aligned with the structure (95% CI [.56, .15], p < .01),
and numerically more Director-centered expressions (14% vs. 25%) when they were the
ones aligned with the structure (95% CI [.09, .32], p = .27).
When Matchers were aligned with the intrinsic structure during the description, the
Matcher’s perspective dominated Directors’ descriptions whether it was available in
advance or not. As Fig. 5a and 5b illustrate, when Matchers were at 0°, Directors adopted
predominately their partner’s perspective, using significantly more Matcher-centered than
Director-centered (95% CI [.15, .56], p < .01) or Structure-centered expressions (95% CI
[.18, .56], p < . 01). This preference for Matcher-centered over Director-centered expres-
sions was reliably significant when Directors hadn’t known in advance that Matchers
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would be at 0° (45% vs. 0% of 144 expressions, 95% CI [.74, 15], p < .01) and mar-
ginally so when they had known it in advance (31% vs. 5% of 161 expressions, 95% CI
[.56, 03], p = .07).
Advance knowledge of the Matcher’s viewpoint at learning did not influence reliably
the distribution of the three types of spatial descriptions, F(2, 36) = 1.83, p = .18.
Despite this lack of an interaction, Directors who had known the Matcher’s viewpoint
in advance did use fewer Director-centered than Matcher-centered expressions overall
(7% vs. 26% of 763 expressions; 95% CI [.36, .02], p < .05). The distribution of
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. Proportion of Director-centered, Matcher-centered, and Structure-centered expressions when the
Matcher’s viewpoint was available (a) or unavailable (b) at study, across the three conditions of alignment
with the intrinsic structure: when the structure is aligned with the Director (i.e., Director at 0°, Matcher at
135°), when the structure is aligned with the Matcher (i.e., Director at 225°, Matcher at 0°), and when the
structure is aligned with neither partner (i.e., Director at 225°, Matcher at 135°).
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expressions when neither partner was aligned with the intrinsic structure also exempli-
fies this shift away from an egocentric stance when the partner’s viewpoint was known.
As illustrated by the black bars across Fig. 4a and b, Directors who had known in
advance that Matchers would also be misaligned with the intrinsic structure used fewer
Director-centered expressions than when they had not known in advance (1% vs. 27%
of 813 expressions, 95% CI [.05, .47] p < .05) and, as illustrated by the white bars,
used numerically more Structure-centered descriptions (15% vs. 0%, 95% CI: [.33,
.02], p = .08). A similar, albeit not reliable, shift away from an egocentric stance was
also observed when Directors were aligned with the intrinsic structure. Directors at 0°
who had not known at study that Matcher’s would later be at 135° (Fig. 5b) used
numerically more egocentric expressions (34% Director-centered vs. 10% Matcher-cen-
tered of 253 expressions; 95% CI [.05, .54], p = .10), whereas those who had known
in advance (Fig. 5a) used comparable proportions of egocentric and Matcher-centered
expressions (17% Director-centered vs. 18% Matcher-centered of 238 expressions; 95%
CI [.31, .27], n.s.).
Finally, to examine whether the Directors’ prior memory organization influenced
their descriptions, we conducted analyses that included as a factor the perspective
from which Directors had drawn the arrays (and thus the preferred direction of
their memory representations, as confirmed by JRD performance). On its own, the
alignment of the Directors drawings did not influence reliably the distribution of
Director-centered, Matcher-centered, and Structure-centered expressions they had used,
F(1, 15) = 1.23, p = .29. However, in pairs with neither partner aligned with the
structure, the distribution of the Directors’ expressions did differ depending on the
alignment of their drawings: those who had drawn arrays aligned with the intrinsic
structure used significantly more Structure-centered expressions than those who had
drawn arrays from 225° (30% vs. 0%, 95% CI: [.12, .48], p < .01). This led to a sig-
nificant three-way interaction between the type of expression, the alignment of the
Directors’ drawings, and the relative alignment of the partners during the description,
F(2, 30) = 4.43, p < .05.
Three main conclusions emerge regarding the Directors’ descriptions. First, the extent
to which speakers described arrays from their own viewpoint, their partner’s viewpoint,
or by referring to the layout’s intrinsic structure depended largely on the two partners’
alignment relative to the intrinsic structure during the description. When the intrinsic
structure was aligned with the partner, speakers used overall more partner-centered
expressions, even when they hadn’t known this in advance. Second, knowing the part-
ner’s viewpoint in advance reduced the use of egocentric expressions relative to partner-
centered ones in some circumstances. This was the case when neither partner was aligned
with the intrinsic structure (and marginally so when the speaker was). And third, speakers
did not plan their descriptions solely based on their memory representations; the preferred
direction of speakers’ memory did not influence reliably the distribution of expressions
they used. However, when neither partner was aligned with the intrinsic structure, speak-
ers were more likely to refer to the structure in their descriptions when they had used an
axis of the structure as an organizing direction in memory.
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4. Discussion
Our findings demonstrate that people combine multiple cues, including representational
and social ones, to guide their spatial perspective-taking behavior. As we describe in
more detail in the following sections, a clear picture emerges: People consider jointly var-
ious cues, whether these are available a priori or become perceptually available during
the interaction, weighing them according to their salience and relevance to the task. They
select the perspective that is most reinforced by these cues to organize spatial information
in memory or to describe this information. As we will argue, people do so because, in
the context of joint tasks, they appraise that a perspective reinforced by multiple cues is
optimally effective for minimizing their collective effort.
4.1. People use multiple cues to select the preferred direction of their spatial memories
In our study, the preferred direction around which people organized spatial relations in
memory depended on whose viewpoint was reinforced by the orientation of the configura-
tion’s intrinsic structure. This was reflected in how Directors had drawn their arrays.
When Directors had studied the layout while aligned with its intrinsic structure, they
defaulted to using their own viewpoint as the organizing direction, regardless of whether
they knew their partner’s subsequent viewpoint. On the other hand, when Directors had
studied the layout while misaligned with its intrinsic structure, knowing their Matcher’s
subsequent viewpoint relative to the intrinsic structure influenced the organization of their
memories: They were more likely to use one of the structure’s axes (vs. their study view-
point) as an organizing direction when they knew that the Matcher would subsequently
be aligned with the intrinsic structure, whereas they were more likely to use their study
viewpoint (vs. an axis of the structure) when they didn’t know their Matcher’s subsequent
viewpoint. When They knew that the Matcher would also be misaligned with the struc-
ture, Directors were equally likely to exploit the structure’s axis and to use their own
viewpoint as an organizing direction.
The performance of Directors in the JRD task corroborated that the organizing direction
of spatial relations in memory was in line with the orientation of their drawings. Directors
who drew arrays from one of the structure’s orthogonal axes were faster in JRDs to orient to
and respond from headings aligned with the structure’s orthogonal axes (0°, 90°, 180°,
270°). Similarly, those who drew arrays misaligned with the structure, from their study
viewpoint of 225°, showed facilitation in orienting to and responding from that viewpoint
(and for 315°, 45°, 135°). The orientation and response latencies of each group of Directors
suggest that they either represented all facilitated orientations (McNamara, 2003), or else
that headings orthogonal to their preferred direction were more easily adopted at retrieval
than oblique ones. Further research could distinguish these two possibilities. For our pur-
poses, the most pertinent point is that performance in JRDs demonstrated facilitation for the
preferred direction indicated by the Directors’ drawings. Together, the findings of both
memory tasks underscore that the alignment of a given partner with the intrinsic structure
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affords sufficient pragmatic motivation to organize spatial relations from that viewpoint:
When the orientation of the intrinsic structure converges with a partner’s viewpoint, it moti-
vates its use as the preferred direction in memory.
This contextualizes our earlier findings that, when no intrinsic structure is available,
people may encode the partner’s viewpoint in memory but not necessarily use it as an
organizing direction (Galati et al., 2013). When studying a randomly configured layout,
organizing spatial relations around the partner’s viewpoint is likely costly and unneces-
sary if speakers can interact freely (cf., Shelton & McNamara, 2004). With such insuffi-
cient motivation to invest in organizing spatial relations from the partner’s available
viewpoint, it makes sense that speakers in Galati et al. (2013) simply encoded the part-
ner’s viewpoint, since they could use this information later as needed.
Other studies have shown that people can use a nonegocentric perspective as an orga-
nizing direction in memory, upon explicit instruction. Instructions to learn an array from
a nonegocentric perspective in a noninteractive task (Greenauer & Waller, 2008) or to
describe a layout from another’s perspective in an interactive task (Shelton & McNamara,
2004) have been effective in setting a nonegocentric preferred direction in memory. Here
we show that, even in the absence of such explicit instructions, people can spontaneously
adopt a nonegocentric perspective as an organizing direction, at no apparent cost, when it
is supported by additional cues. Thus, although the mere availability of the partner’s
viewpoint may on its own be an insufficient cue to set the preferred direction of spatial
memories (Galati et al., 2013), it can be sufficient in other contexts, as when reinforced
by another relevant cue, such as the configuration’s intrinsic structure.
Our present findings, in line with those of Mou and McNamara (2002), demonstrate that
the intrinsic structure contributes to organizing spatial relations from a nonegocentric view-
point. However, our findings also differ in some ways. In that study, participants overall
opted to use the intrinsic structure as their preferred direction in memory even when con-
verging cues from the environmental structure were removed (by placing the layout within a
circular room). In our study, participants did not always opt for the intrinsic structure’s axes
as an organizing direction (see also Richard & Waller, 2013). In fact, the majority (75%) of
participants who studied the array from 225° without knowing their partner’s viewpoint
(which could have highlighted the intrinsic structure) opted for their own, egocentric view-
point. This discrepancy between our findings and Mou and McNamara’s (2002) may suggest
that, rather than giving precedence to particular cues in spatial reasoning—with the intrinsic
structure, for instance, being most dominant—people weigh multiple cues probabilistically,
according to task-specific demands, in order to determine their preferred reference frame.
As we point out next, this probabilistic weighing of cues is relevant not only for encoding
spatial information in memory but also for describing it.
4.2. People adapt their memories and descriptions with the aim of minimizing their
collective effort
We consider the partner’s viewpoint and the intrinsic structure of spatial configurations
to be among those relevant cues that contribute to the selection of a spatial perspective in
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joint spatial tasks. Our view is that this selection is made consistently with the principle
of least collaborative effort (Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986)—the proposal
that people share responsibility for mutual understanding, and try to maximize their effi-
ciency of coordination and minimize their collective effort. By this principle, when the
intrinsic structure converged with the partner’s viewpoint, speakers likely appraised that
it would be most efficient to adopt that perspective in later descriptions; they were thus
willing to invest the cognitive effort at study to encode spatial relations from that non-
egocentric perspective. Conversely, when the intrinsic structure converged with the speak-
ers’ own viewpoint, they likely appraised that it would be most efficient to use that
perspective in the subsequent collaboration, and thus did not incorporate their partner’s
viewpoint in their memory representations.
Appraisals about the relative cognitive burden of each partner in the task influenced
not only the preferred direction around which speakers organized spatial information in
memory, as discussed in the previous section, but also how they actually described this
information. When the orientation of the intrinsic structure converged with their partner’s
viewpoint, speakers alleviated their partner’s cognitive burden by describing spatial rela-
tions from the partner’s viewpoint. When the orientation of the intrinsic structure con-
verged with the speakers’ own viewpoint, speakers tended to describe spatial information
from their own perspective, with their partners having to unpack the spatial mappings of
those egocentric descriptions. Thus, for both their memory organization and their descrip-
tions, speakers flexibly adopted the perspective reinforced by converging cues, presum-
ably because they considered this perspective to be optimal for minimizing their
collective effort.
Before addressing how our work extends the principle of least collaborative effort, we
turn to two pertinent questions. First, when is spatial perspective-taking in fact most com-
putationally demanding for a language user? And second, is the speakers’ adaptation in
fact effective at minimizing their collective effort?
With respect to the first question, our findings offer a caveat to earlier demonstrations
that, in spatial tasks, misalignment determines a language user’s cognitive demands (e.g.,
Duran et al., 2011; Mainwaring et al., 2003; Schober, 1993, 1995). Here, when Directors
were at 0° and Matchers at 135°, Directors overall opted for their own perspective in
descriptions, presumably because reasoning from an oblique perspective was computa-
tionally more difficult (support for the relative difficulty of adopting the oblique 135° off-
set also comes from Galati et al., 2013). However, when Matchers were at 0° and
Directors at 225° (also a 135° offset), Directors readily opted for their partner’s perspec-
tive in descriptions. This illustrates that misalignment on its own does not determine spa-
tial perspective choices; people do not simply perform mental rotation in order to
consider their partner’s viewpoint. Instead, by considering their partner’s misaligned
viewpoint along with other cues, they make attributions about their respective ability to
contribute to advance the goals of the task (see also Duran et al., 2011).
With respect to the second question, in other work, we have examined specifically
whether speakers’ perspective choices are in fact successful at minimizing pairs’ collec-
tive effort, as indicated by performance outcomes (Galati & Avraamides, 2013). By
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examining the number of conversational turns that pairs from the present corpus took to
complete the task and the degree of distortion in their tabletop reconstructions, we con-
firmed that speakers’ description strategies generally facilitated coordination. For instance,
when Matchers were aligned with the intrinsic structure, which was when Directors used
predominately Matcher-centered descriptions, interactions were the most efficient in terms
of conversational turns relative to the other alignment conditions. Moreover, Matchers
reconstructed more accurate (i.e., less distorted) layouts as Directors used greater propor-
tions of Matcher-centered expressions. Since in that condition it was presumably easier
for Matchers to interpret descriptions from their own perspective, the Directors’ descrip-
tion strategy turned out to be successful in terms of improving both efficiency and accu-
racy.
In our view, the extent to which speakers’ perspective choices are effective at improv-
ing performance outcomes depends on how these outcomes are weighted by the task’s
goals and constraints. The available cues (e.g., partner’s viewpoint, the intrinsic structure
of the configuration), the affordances of the communicative situation (e.g., lacking visibil-
ity of each other’s work stations), and the goals of communication (e.g., aiming for an
accurate reconstruction) influence, along with speakers’ perspective choices, the criterion
that partners adopt to reach the mutual belief that they have understood each other well
enough for their purposes. Depending on this “grounding criterion” (Clark & Brennan,
1991), an effective strategy may in some circumstances dissociate performance outcomes
(e.g., accuracy and efficiency), if these dimensions are weighted differently by the task’s
goals.
The present work further qualifies the principle of least collaborative effort by high-
lighting that speakers consider the goals, affordances, and available cues of the task,
across all of its phases, in order to select the “optimal” perspective. Speakers gauge their
own and their partner’s cognitive effort for each phase of the joint task (e.g., when
encoding the information and when describing it), using all the information they have
available. This enables them to determine whether investing additional effort at an early
stage would yield savings during the subsequent coordination. Such considerations are
relevant to several real-world scenarios in which speakers first have to commit certain
spatial information to memory and convey it to someone else at a later point (e.g., study-
ing a map as a co-pilot on a road trip to memorize the planned route and give directions
from memory later to the driver).
When Directors in our study knew in advance that their partner’s viewpoint would be
aligned with the layout’s intrinsic structure, they were more likely to adopt an axis of the
structure as an organizing direction at encoding, presumably because they anticipated this
would make the planning of spatial descriptions easier during the interaction. In other
tasks, in which speakers do not have to retrieve spatial layouts from memory, but rather
have visual access to them as they are describing them (e.g., Schober, 1993, 1995; Shel-
ton & McNamara, 2004), this initial investment of effort may not be a relevant concern.
Nevertheless, these speakers still select their preferred perspective on the basis of task-
dependent constraints of the description phase (e.g., Does the addressee know where I am
or not? Is the addressee aligned or misaligned with me?), and accommodate for their
A. Galati, M. N. Avraamides / Cognitive Science 39 (2015) 759
partners when they perceive them to be limited, consistently with the principle of least
collaborative effort. As we expound on in the next section, speakers take into account
both a priori and perceptually available information when planning and executing a joint
task. This may sometimes involve revising a strategy (e.g., an initially preferred perspec-
tive) in light of information emerging at a new phase.
4.3. People use both a priori and perceptually available cues in spatial perspective
taking
When speakers select the perspective from which to describe information, they use not
only social and representational information available in advance but also information
that is perceptually available in the communicative setting. In the present study, speakers
did not merely rely on the organization of their memories when describing spatial lay-
outs. In fact, the distribution of speakers’ spatial expressions did not reliably depend on
their preferred direction in memory (as reflected by their array drawings). For instance,
Directors who studied the array from 225° without knowing their Matcher’s viewpoint
used overwhelmingly Matcher-centered descriptions when interacting with a Matcher at
0°, even though most of them had used their own viewpoint as the preferred direction of
their memories.
The flexible use of a priori and perceptually available information is consistent with
findings that, in describing spatial relations, people do not always adhere to their mem-
ory’s organizing direction when it conflicts with perceptual evidence; instead, they can
use both sources of information to select the perspective of their descriptions (Galati
et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011). This is congruent with our earlier point that in dynamic,
multi-phase tasks, conversational partners estimate their relative cognitive demands across
all stages of the joint task, using all information they have available at a given stage and
updating their perspective-taking strategies along the way.
The prior organization of Directors’ memory representations seemed to influence
descriptions primarily when neither partner was aligned with the intrinsic structure: Those
who had organized spatial relations according to the structure’s axis used structure-based
descriptions more frequently than those who had organized relations from their own
viewpoint (225°). Knowing in advance that neither partner would be aligned with the
intrinsic structure may have underscored the bilateral axis of symmetry across which both
partners were juxtaposed. Thus, considering at study the partner’s misaligned perspective
in the context of intrinsic spatial cues can highlight nonegocentric perspectives for orga-
nizing information.
Although in our study, we have focused on a priori information concerning the part-
ner’s spatial viewpoint, other a priori information about the partner may have also influ-
enced speakers’ descriptions since pairs here were friends. Shared knowledge could have
increased Structured-centered descriptions through references to shared spatial schemas
(e.g., shared familiarity with the game “tic-tac-toe,” which was referred to by a few
pairs). Or, based on prior experience, speakers may have been better able make accurate
attributions about their partner’s spatial abilities, and thus tailored their descriptions
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accordingly (see Schober, 2009, for evidence that pairs adapt the perspective of their
descriptions according to their relative spatial abilities). On the other hand, in light of
findings that speakers are more likely to make egocentric errors with friends due to over-
estimating that their friends know what they know (Savitsky, Keysar, Epley, Carter, &
Swanson, 2011), speakers here may have been more likely to organize information in
memory egocentrically or to describe spatial layouts from their own perspective. Even
though it is possible that speakers in our study described information somewhat differ-
ently than they would have with partners who were strangers (e.g., referring to more spa-
tial schemas or being more egocentric), they still adapted their description choices
flexibly, according to their relative alignment with the intrinsic structure and their
advance knowledge of that. For instance, egocentric descriptions were reduced when
speakers knew their partners’ viewpoint in advance and were almost absent when the
partner’s viewpoint was aligned with the intrinsic structure. Thus, although friendship as
a social cue may have influenced perspective-taking, it did not trump the influence of
other social and representational cues.
4.4. Toward a framework for flexible perspective-taking
As we have seen, when selecting the perspective from which to encode or describe
spatial information, people consider a confluence of different sources of information—
social, egocentric, and representational. The adaptation we document in spatial perspec-
tive-taking underscores that people use all information as soon as it becomes available, in
whichever phase of the joint task (whether at study or at collaboration), weighing them
according to their salience and their relevance to the task’s goals to make attributions
about their respective ability to advance the task. Thus, when a representational cue, such
as the intrinsic structure, converges with the speaker’s learning viewpoint, the speaker
will opt for that egocentric viewpoint; when the intrinsic structure converges with a social
cue, such as the partner’s viewpoint, the speaker will opt for the partner’s viewpoint.
Thus, social cues can shape not only the interpretation of spatial descriptions (Duran
et al., 2011) but also the production of spatial descriptions and, critically, the underlying
memory representations supporting those descriptions (cf. H€olscher et al., 2011; Mainwar-
ing et al., 2003; Schober, 1993, 1995, 2009).
Speakers do not invariably default to their egocentric perspective, whether for encod-
ing or for describing spatial information, as the proposal of Keysar and his colleagues
would predict (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, Barr, Balin et al., 1998; Keysar, Barr, &
Horton, 1998). Instead, our findings suggest that what constitutes the “easiest” or “opti-
mal” perspective for speakers to adopt is not defined solely in terms of egocentric experi-
ence, but rather in terms of the convergence of multiple, relevant sources of information.
These sources of information are taken into consideration as soon as they become avail-
able in the task and not as a late adjustment to repair misunderstandings.
This is in line with the view that information from different sources—including the
shared environment with conversational partners, discourse context, and within-sentence
structural, and lexical biases—are integrated probabilistically and in parallel to shape
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behavior (e.g., Jurafsky, 1996; MacDonald, 1994; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995). Thus,
when information about the conversational partner’s needs is available early enough and
is represented simply (see Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Galati & Brennan, 2010; Hanna,
Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003), it is weighted alongside other relevant constraints and
enables speakers to tailor their behavior appropriately. In collaborative spatial tasks, this
information includes the partner’s location in space, which in combination with other
cues—properties of the objects, the intrinsic structure of the layout and the surrounding
environment, the speaker’s egocentric viewpoint, and explicit instructions—leads to infer-
ences about the relative difficulty of reasoning from that perspective.
We take the adaptation we report here to reflect the general flexibility of the cognitive
system, rather than to be specialized for spatial perspective taking. The principles guiding
how people consider their conversational partner’s spatial perspective—of using multiple
sources of information, of using information whenever it becomes available, of aiming to
minimize collective effort—are not unlike those guiding how they consider their partner’s
conceptual construal, their knowledge, or agenda (see Schober, 1998).
In sum, in collaborative spatial tasks, people adapt both their memory representations
and linguistic behavior flexibly, in nuanced ways. They take into account converging
social and representational cues, whenever they become available—whether through
advance information or perceptual evidence—to appraise whose perspective would be
optimal for coordinating most efficiently. This joint consideration of multiple cues influ-
ences whether people encode their partner’s available viewpoint in memory and whether
they adopt it in descriptions.
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Notes
1. Note that two-thirds of the Directors who studied arrays without knowing their
Matcher’s subsequent viewpoint were actually in the same situation, even if their
circumstances at the description phase differed: They studied arrays at 225°,
whether they later described the array to a Matcher who was at 0° (Aligned with
Matcher) or at 135° (Aligned with Neither). Thus, the organizational preferences of
these Directors as indicated by their memory tests, which preceded descriptions,
were considered together (see Table 1).
2. There were no reliable effects involving gender. In the JRD task, orientation and
response latencies did not differ significantly between male and female Directors.
762 A. Galati, M. N. Avraamides / Cognitive Science 39 (2015)
Also, gender did not interact with performance across headings. In descriptions, the
distribution of spatial expressions that Directors used was not influenced by the
gender combination of the pairs or the gender of the Director; neither the main
effect nor the interaction of each these factors with the type of spatial expression
was significant.
3. We also recorded pointing error in JRD responses—the unsigned angular deviation
of the joystick response from the veridical response. Pointing error demonstrated
the same sawtooth pattern of performance obtained for orientation and response
latencies (Fig. 3), although it was not reliable. There were somewhat high pointing
errors (M = 64.56°, SD = 65.33°), despite the lack of a speed accuracy tradeoff.
Although, within participants, latency-error correlations did differ significantly from
zero (for orientation latencies: t (23) = 2.55, p < .05; for response latencies:
t (23) = 2.10, p < .05), these were in the opposite direction than that expected by a
speed accuracy trade off (for orientation latency the mean Pearson’s r = .06,
SD = .12; for response latency Pearson’s r = .05, SD = .12). As we pointed out in
Galati et al. (2013), the high pointing errors are likely an artifact of joystick
mechanics biasing responses away from the intended bearing. Because the joystick
shaft moves within a square base, reproducing angles at diagonals (i.e., 45°, 135°,
225°, and 315°) is easier than other angles.
4. Drawings classified as being drawn from 0° had a mean h of 0.58° (SD = 1.08°),
those classified as being drawn from 180° a mean h of 190.37° (SD = 22.04°),
those classified as being drawn from 225° a mean h of 227.17° (SD = 9.24°), and
the drawing classified as being drawn from 270° had a h of 269.59°. The perspec-
tive assigned to each drawing was indeed correlated highly with the drawing’s cor-
responding rotation parameter (h), Pearson’s r = .99, p < .001.
5. Initially, we had analyzed performance on the Judgments of Relative Direction task
while ignoring the organization suggested by the Directors’ drawings. Those results
were obfuscated by the fact that when studying arrays from 225°, Directors some-
times opted for their own viewpoint and other times opted for one of the axes of
the intrinsic structure as their preferred direction (as shown in Table 1).
6. To examine this sawtooth pattern of facilitated performance, other researchers (e.g.,
Greenauer & Waller, 2008) have used custom contrast weights with only one mini-
mum value (e.g., 0.625, 1.375, 0.625, 0.375, 1.625, 0.375, 0.625, 1.375).
We adapted these weights to represent a pattern with two minima, upon reasoning
that in our study all but one of the Directors who had drawn arrays aligned with
the intrinsic structure did so either from 0° or 180°.
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